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On the problem of diagnosing schizophrenia and affective disorder in the two countries, the two sources of information are (1) direct observation of cases and (2) comparative vital statistics. From the first source, i.e. direct observation, one is surprised in reviewing the literature to find how little information is available at this time. A study should meet the following standards: patients selected on random basis (or at least not for any diagnostic characteristics), and diagnosed by direct interview, film or videotape by a representative panel of cross-national psychiatrists.
The study of Sandifer et al. (1968) is still the major direct comparison of cross-national diagnoses on randomly selected cases. In this study the observers viewed films of 30 admissions to a public mental hospital in North Carolina. The patients were chosen without any consideration of clinical characteristics. The observers in London (A Hordern, P K Bridges, H S Greer and I S Kreeger) came from diverse backgrounds of training and experience. The Glasgow group (G C Timbury, I M Ingram, A N Munro and J M Carlisle) had more similar training. In North Carolina, 8 psychiatrists were randomly drawn from a pool of 40, representing two universities, a state hospital system and private practice.
In reviewing the data of this study on schizophrenia and affective disorder, schizo-affective is included under schizophrenia; the affective group includes manic depressive, psychotic depressive, neurotic depressive and involutional diagnoses. In 461 opinions on the 30 cases, schizophrenia was diagnosed by 18% of US observers and 16% of UK observers; affective disorder was diagnosed by 38 % of US and 33 % of UK observers. Quite surprisingly, the preponderance of schizophrenia among US diagnoses and affective disorder among UK diagnoses, which might have been expected, was not found. The proportions of both categories are essentially the same for the two countries. The original paper did report twice as many manic depressive diagnoses, as a specific category, by the UK group. But the more frequent use of neurotic depressive diagnoses by the Americans resulted in essentially the same number of affective cases. The original publication noted little difference between the two groups on schizophrenia.
On a matter of such interest and importance, one cannot, of course, draw extensive conclusions from a study which includes only 30 cases. It happens, however, that this is the only report found which satisfied the stated criteria. Reference will be made to other studies, but none satisfy the criterion of randomly selected patients diagnosed by a cross-national panel of observers.
Subsequently, 10 of these 30 cases were shown, not only in North Carolina and in the United Kingdom, but also in Switzerland. Dr Frida Surawicz, a colleague at Kentucky, took ten films from the group of thirty to Berne. The only diagnostic factor in the film selection was a deliberate preference for cases with a depressive diagnosis. Dr Surawicz prepared an English and German text of the interview, a procedure of great value even to observers familiar with the languages. These films were shown to an average of 16 Swiss psychiatrists per case (Surawicz & disorder, the sum is essentially the same. Obviously this type of work needs to be greatly expanded, but a much more similar diagnostic pattern was found than had been anticipated.
Much interest has been shown in clinically difficult cases. Katz et al. (1969) number naturally occurring is probably not greater than one in ten, and these are not in pure culture, i.e. with psychiatrists from a given nation moving en masse to a single diagnostic category. Fascinating as these cases naturally are, they give an impression of a greater diagnostic difference between our nations than may exist. There is another group of studies, not quite direct, of considerable interest from the Maudsley-Columbia group (Cooper et al. 1969 , Gurland et al. 1970 ). The second study included more cases and more hospitals and will be briefly reviewed. The research project staff used a standard interview and evaluated 119 cases admitted to nine hospitals in the New York area and 174 cases admitted to nine hospitals serving the greater London area. The diagnostic comparison was between the hospital diagnoses in New York and the project staff diagnoses there; the same comparison was made in London where the project staff had largely been trained at the Maudsley. The proportion of schizophrenia to affective disorders found in this study is shown in Fig 2. At the top, it can be seen that the London hospital psychiatrists and the project psychiatrists agreed rather well on proportions of affective disorder and schizophrenia. Both observer groups recorded slightly more affective than schizophrenic admissions to the London hospitals. In marked contrast, the New York hospital psychiatrists and the project psychiatrists showed a striking diagnostic difference on schizophrenia and affective disorder. Again the project psychiatrists diagnosed slightly more affective disorder than schizophrenia, but the New York hospital staff favoured schizophrenia by a ratio of 9:1 ! Findings such as this lead to an almost irresistible impulse to ask 'Who is right?' The authors correctly point out that this question cannot be readily answered by this method. Examining the admissions to all states separately, the ratio of schizophrenia to affective disorders in each of the states (that had more than 500 total admissions) was calculated. In Fig 3, Fig 2 s, schizophrenia; A, affective disorder between the states in the percentage of schizophrenia in relation to affective disorder. A typical state admits one case with schizophrenia for every 2 with affective disorder, but one state has a reversed ratio. This state with 62% schizophrenic, as indicated by the large dot on the right, is New York. This would not be of any great consequence except that so many visitors come only to New York and gain a general impression from it. As this figure illustrates, New York is not diagnostically representative of the country as a whole (it differs, in fact, very substantially from even its neighbouring states). The thesis is that diagnostic differences between our two countries on schizophrenia and affective disorder are less than had been previously supposed. Three factors have, in my opinion, tended to exaggerate the apparent differences:
(1) A focus on manic-depressive disorder alone. A true and substantial difference apparently exists between the United States and the United Kingdom on this specific category, but this does not extend to affective disorder as a whole.
(2) A focus on 'interesting cases'. These, fascinating as they are in themselves, have in my opinion, magnified these differences out of proportion.
(3) A focus on New York. As the state-by-state analysis shows, New York is atypical in its diagnostic patterns for the United States as a whole. Certainly the predisposition to 'schizophrenia' appears much greater there.
The Diagnostic Process
In a previous study (Sandifer et al. 1970) , we found that on one-third of the occasions the observers favoured a single diagnostic category at the end of only three minutes of observation. Of course, it is not always this way; there are other cases on which a decision is reached only after the most deliberate sifting of all available information. In terms of mechanical analogies, one approach seems to be like a 'sensing device' which quickly zeros on the target. The other model is like an 'adding machine' which does not arrive at the sum until after the last entry. The point is that the first, the going to the target, does not affect diagnostic agreement adversely, since psychiatrists, by and large, utilize this method only on the most obvious cases.
One interesting aspect of cross-national studies is the tendency of US psychiatrists to report more pathology. Katz et al. (1969) found higher scores by the US observers on their single case. My colleagues and I found that US observers reported twice as many symptoms (Sandifer et al. 1969) . Undoubtedly these observations will be borne out by additional studies. This finding seems to be associated with a tendency in the United States to use the ideal, rather than the average, as the point where pathology begins.
It would be fortunate if our definitions of categories had more to do with diagnostic disagreements (than I think they do). If so, a resolution of our difficulties would be easier. But psychiatrists agree on the prototypes (stereotypes) of categories better than had previously been supposed (Overall & Gorham 1963 , Smith 1966 , Sandifer et al 1966 . In our study of crossnational stereotypes, my colleagues and I found that stereotype agreement was good both within and across national groups ). We have all learned our lessons rather well, and know the textbook definitions, but all might not agree that a particular patient has certain characteristics (and in a particular order of importance). The primary origin of our diagnostic differences lies, in my opinion, in the way different observers view the same patient.
This point is amenable to study. I will not go into extensive detail of our work, but touch on the general findings, especially the 'paired comparisons' approach. First, the agreement-disagreement dichotomy of diagnosis was expanded to seven steps of increasing diagnostic deviance. This gave a rough measure of how well any particular pair of observers agreed or disagreed on diagnosis. Next a measure of how well all pairs agreed on symptoms was calculated. The method for this calculation was derived from a textbook of taxonomy (Sokal & Sneath 1963) . or the diagnosis ? We asked ourselves that question. As best I could learn from my own mental processes during diagnosis, it can go either way. Sometimes the diagnosis bursts into consciousness before one is aware of the reasons why. More often the traditional sequence, symptoms to diagnosis, takes place. In either case, the two tend to hang together, and that, in my opinion, is the primary reason that we have difficulty arriving at diagnostic consensus. It is not a reason which lends itself to simple resolution, but at least the diagnostic differences have a meaning. If we believe the figures from studies (Sandifer et al. 1964) , perhaps one-fifth or more of cases are not sufficiently clear to warrant a specific diagnosis. It may be that professional pride and the pressure for statistical neatness makes us venture more boldly to diagnostic certainty than the facts of a particular case actually warrant. In such cases, deferring the diagnosis would increase the reliability of the remainder.
In summary: (1) The affective-schizophrenia difference between UK and US psychiatrists may be less than had been previously supposed. (2) The principal 'cause' of individual psychiatrists' disagreement on diagnosis appears to be differential emphasis on the characteristics of the particular patient.
